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Abstract 
 
Predictive analytics are data-driven software 
tools that draw on confirmed relationships between 
variables to predict future outcomes. Hence they may 
provide government with new analytical capabilities 
for enhancing policy decision-making effectiveness in 
turbulent environments. However, predictive 
analytics system use research is still lacking. 
Therefore, this study adapts the existing model of 
strategic decision-making effectiveness to examine 
government use of predictive analytics in turbulent 
times and to identify barriers to using information 
effectively in enhancing policy decision making 
effectiveness. We use a case study research to 
address two research questions in the context of the 
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident.  Our study found 
varying levels of proactive use of SPEEDI predictive 
analytics system during the escalating nuclear 
reactor meltdowns between Japan’s central 
government agencies and between the central and the 
state government levels. Using the model, we argue 
that procedural rationality and political behavior can 
be used to explain some observed variations.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Using information effectively in policy decision-
making under normal conditions faces added 
complexity from various internal and external 
factors: (1) datification in government, (2) the rise of 
big data in government characterized by volume 
(scale of data), variety (different data formats), 
velocity (streaming data) and veracity (uncertain data 
quality), and (3) technological drivers such as social 
media platforms, mobile computing, and cloud 
computing in government. Moreover, policy makers 
in many countries face greater complexity in making 
effective use of information for policy decisions to 
produce desired policy impacts in turbulent times in 
high-velocity external environments, in no small part 
due to natural disasters and man-made disasters such 
as mass international movement of refugees, urban 
terror attacks, oil spills and nuclear accidents [11, 12, 
20, 39, 55]. 
In the private sector, which faces not only 
turbulent but also competitive decision environments, 
big data, business intelligence, and business analytics 
have been increasingly adopted and used to enhance 
organizational, analytical capabilities such as 
organizational memory, information integration, 
insight creation and visual presentation [43], 
managerial decision-making effectiveness [10], 
organizational performance [30, 44], and supply 
chain performance [51, 56]. In contrast, while the use 
of big data [21], business intelligence, and business 
analytics tools by large-size local governments in the 
U.S. has been studied for enhanced public services in 
the e-government field [13], there remains a relative 
lack of knowledge and understanding about effective 
business analytics use in a policy decision-making 
context in turbulent times.  
Therefore, this paper aims to explore the 
following two inter-related research questions: (1) 
How does government – policy experts and decision 
makers – use information produced by predictive 
analytics systems in a way which they influence good 
policy choices in turbulent times? (2) What are 
technological, political, and institutional barriers to 
proactive use of predictive analytics systems? We 
address these research questions by adopting a 
“Model of Strategic Decision-Making Effectiveness” 
[15, p. 373], because this model provides variables 
which are relevant to our topic of policy decision-
making effectiveness made in turbulent times. 
However, we modify the model by adding a new 
variable: information technology (IT) use/predictive 
analytics system use.  
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A specific research context draws on the 3.11 
compound catastrophe that devastated Fukushima 
prefecture at the north eastern part of Japan. In the 
immediate aftermath of the March 11 2011 Japan 
Great East Earthquake and the subsequent tsunamis 
in excess of 14 meters, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant (herein called “F1” by its owner, Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, Ltd. – TEPCO) lost both 
main external power supplies and internal back-up 
generators, causing reactor core meltdowns which 
were rated as Level 7 (the worst kind) by The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this 
policy decision-making context, Japan’s policy 
makers showed the varying levels of intensive use of 
an advanced predictive analytics distributed network 
system – “System for Prediction of Environmental 
Emergency Dose Information Network System” 
(referred to as “SPEEDI”). 
While our research context is the compound 
catastrophe, this paper’s central focus is not disaster 
management research. It is centrally focused on the 
varying use of SPEEDI-generated information and its 
impacts on policy decision-making effectiveness that 
influenced the critical mass evacuation policy 
choices.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: A 
review of relevant literatures is presented in Section 
2. Our research context is described in Section 3. 
Section 4 describes our research methodology. 
Section 5 discusses our key findings. Finally, Section 
6 presents our discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Policy decision-making effectiveness in 
turbulent times 
 
“A Model of Strategic Decision-Making 
Effectiveness” explicates private-sector strategic 
decision process and strategic decision-making 
effectiveness [15, p. 373]. Despite its original 
private-sector orientation, the model identifies 
variables of importance to study strategic decisions. 
We further hold that the government’s policy 
decisions made in turbulent times are largely 
strategic decisions in that they are designed to 
influence favorably the key factors such as resource 
allocation, knowledge sharing, and stakeholder buy-
in on which the desired policy outcomes critically 
depend. Moreover, we modified the original model 
by adding a new model concept: use of IT, because 
recent studies show the impacts of IT-enabled 
organizational agility [36, 48] customer agility [31, 
41] in sensing and responding to rapidly changing 
decision environments in turbulent times.  
The original model postulates that strategic 
decision-making effectiveness (SDME) is a function 
of presence of procedural rationality (PR) and 
absence of political behavior (PB) [15]. The model 
identifies environmental favorability (EF) and quality 
of implementation (QI) as control variables that are 
outside the main focus of their study but can 
indirectly influence strategic decision-making 
effectiveness. Finally, environmental instability (EI) 
positively moderates the relationship between PR and 
SDME and the relationship between EF and SDME. 
Figure 1 shows this Model in a modified graphical 
presentation. A solid line shows a direct effect, 
whereas a dotted line shows an indirect effect. 
Procedural rationality is defined as the extent to 
which decision processes involve the collection of 
relevant information and the analysis of this 
information to make a right choice which can lead to 
SDMD. Political behavior is the result of decision 
makers in organizations having different self-interests 
and being able to use their political influence on 
decisions, which can hinder achieving SDME. 
 
 
Figure 1. A model of strategic decision-
making effectiveness 
 
Environmental instability is defined as a 
dynamically changing external environment that 
results from a shift in market demand and the 
introduction of new disruptive technologies. Because 
PR basically represents the collective information 
processing capacity, the Model argues that the 
relationship between PR and SDME is stronger in 
turbulent environments. Environmental favorability is 
defined as “the extent to which environmental 
conditions subsequent to a decision favor the choice 
that was made.” [15, p. 377]. Finally, the quality of 
decision implementation underscores the competence 
with which the proper steps are taken to execute the 
strategic decision. While our study adopts this model, 
it must be noted that the model does not consider the 
role of information technology (IT) use in enhancing 
SDME.  
There are increased scope, complexity, and 
political aspects of crisis that make strategic and 
political decision making especially challenging for 
policy makers [5]. Policy makers have a tendency to 
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claim they cannot be held responsible for the 
occurrence of a particular crisis, while at the same 
time they assume that they are well prepared for any 
crisis that occurs and take effective measures to 
protect the public in the event of a crisis in these fast 
moving environments. Similarly, firms’ problem 
solving strategies in high velocity environments 
occur with a bounded rationality approach. Firms that 
survived in these high velocity environments are able 
to make agile decisions which enhance performance 
through confidence to act, effective group processes, 
and accelerated cognitive processing [16]. 
Traditionally, in crisis management there is an 
expectation that decisions will be centralized. 
However, research shows that there is multiple 
decision-making taking place simultaneously such as 
informal decentralization, non-decision making, and 
paralysis [5]. In an examination of the Fukushima 
crisis in Japan [6] argues that there is persistent myth 
that crisis management operations are best organized 
in a command and control mode. However, this goes 
against the first phase of a crisis where there typically 
is a lack of information, communication, and 
coordination and it is impossible to control all first 
responders. Therefore, under these circumstances 
effective response is more improvised, flexible, and 
networked, rather than standardized, planned, and 
centrally led. The case of Fukushima was a 
paradigm-shifting crisis that came as a total surprise 
to the Japanese policy makers and the Japanese 
government’s hyper-centralized approach to crisis 
management was seriously questioned [6]. 
Furthermore, empirical research on the 2008 financial  
crisis, when 17 European Union countries tried to 
reduce their growing budgetary deficits, showed that 
increased centralization of decisions leads to more 
centralization throughout the system [40]. The 
stronger the pressure from the outside for change 
leads to greater centralized decisions.  
In an analysis of government dimensions of 
crisis management three important lessons have 
learned [42]. First, a crisis typically raises questions 
about the ineffectiveness of government agencies and 
authorities in preventing the occurrence of the crisis 
in the first place. Second, the frequency of 
government action or inaction does not mean that 
government action is always beneficial since they 
may do things that could make the crisis worse. 
Third, crisis and political events are found within the 
political sphere and this can have a tremendous 
influence on the decisions that are made during and 
after a crisis [32]. 
In regards to policy making the challenges of 
crisis management deal with several important issues 
[6]. First, there are political-administrative challenges 
of preparing government agencies to deal with 
adverse situations that arise. Second, crisis impacts 
its citizens and institutions in a fundamental way and 
citizens’ must demonstrate resilience to bounce back 
after the crisis to establish “normality.” Third, crisis 
requires policy makers to be “deep thinkers” about 
how to move effectively forward. Crisis typically 
comes as a surprise to leaders and their agencies and 
represents the hardest challenges that political leaders 
have ever encountered. However, despite all of these 
challenges, policy makers will ultimately be held 
accountable for their failures. 
 
2.2. Predictive analytics & decision-making 
effectiveness 
Predictive analytics are data-driven software 
tools that draw on confirmed relationships between 
variables to predict future outcomes. The predictions 
that predictive analytics produce are often values, 
indicating the likelihood of a particular behavior or 
event to occur in the future [23]. Advanced analytics-
driven data analyses, which use data, text, and web 
mining technologies, enable strategic decision 
makers to have a full "360 degrees" view of their 
operations and customers [7, p. 155]. Predictive 
analytics not only generate useful models but also 
complement explanatory modeling in theory building 
and theory testing. Despite the importance of 
predictive analytics, however, the use of predictive 
analytics is still very new in the information systems 
(IS) literature [3, 35, 46]. 
While it is not about predictive analytics use, a 
survey research draws on the information processing 
view and contingency theory to examine the effect of 
(descriptive) business analytics use on decision-
making effectiveness at the organizational level [10]. 
Structural equation modeling analysis found that 
business analytics use positively influences 
information processing capability in data-driven 
decision environments. This in turn has a positive 
effect on improving decision-making effectiveness.  
Prior research showed that organizations have 
largely failed to use other types of (non-predictive) 
business analytics – so-called business intelligence 
(BI) systems effectively – to exploit the huge 
volumes of data they captured in their enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems. BI systems use 
analytics and enterprise system databases. As a result, 
BI systems failed to support managerial decision 
making at both the strategic and operational levels, 
and hence failing to create business value through BI 
investments [17, 18]. This empirical study found 
evidence for the importance of BI systems 
assimilation and the need for shared domain 
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knowledge at the strategic and operational levels as 
the drivers of BI business value. Moreover, the study 
suggests the critical importance of organizational 
absorptive capacity, which is the competence to 
collect, absorb, and strategically leverage new 
external information, in developing appropriate 
technology infrastructure and assimilating BI systems 
for managerial decision-making effectiveness. 
Finally, the study found that operational managers' 
absorptive capacity matters to leveraging BI systems, 
although top management plays a significant role in 
effective deployment of BI systems but their 
influence is indirect. This suggests the key to 
leveraging BI systems is BI systems assimilation and 
use from the bottom up as opposed to the top down 
[17]. 
 
3. Research context 
 
3.1. Nuclear reactor meltdowns 
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck east of 
Sendai, Japan, northeast of Tokyo, at 14:46 on March 
23, 2011. The strongest earthquake recorded in Japan 
triggered enormous tsunamis of over 14 meters 
(46 feet). With the epicenter of the earthquake being 
so close to coastal villages and towns, 15,076 people 
were drowned, 10,354 still missing, and more than 
460,000 citizens were evacuated as of July 2011, 
although Japan Meteorological Agency’s national 
tsunami warning system issued severe tsunami early 
warnings at 14:49 [45] within 3 minutes of the M9.0 
earthquake. Many who were drown were trapped in 
their cars which could not move due to the traffic jam 
when the tsunamis arrived. They ignored police’s 
repeated warnings not to use cars for evacuation for 
this reason.  
As the tsunamis flooded inland areas several 
kilometers from shore in Fukushima prefecture of the 
Tōhoku region around 15:30, F1 built on a high 
ground 10 meter above the sea level was seriously 
impacted. The tsunamis destroyed the two main 
power supplies as well as the backup power 
generators in the basement at 15:42, having rendered 
all the mission-critical systems inoperable at Reactors 
1-3 for a sustained period of time, including the 
nuclear reactor cooling systems, containment 
systems, the sensor-based environmental radiation 
monitoring systems, reactor control rooms’ 
information systems, electrical equipment, 
transformers and safety equipment. Furthermore, an 
off-site nuclear emergency command and control 
center for F1 was also powerless and could not 
perform its emergency command, control, 
coordination, and communication functions. 
The central government issued the F1 nuclear 
emergency declaration at 19:03 on March 11. Despite 
the frantic efforts to regain control over the rapidly 
evolving nuclear emergency, nuclear reactor core 
meltdowns occurred at the F1 site, with a powerful 
explosion at the No. 1 reactor at 15:36 on March 12, 
another explosion at the No. 3 reactor at 11:01 on 
March 14, and a third explosion at the No. 2 reactor 
at 6:14 on March 15. In the immediate aftermath of 
the No. 2 reactor explosion, hourly radioactive 
material emissions reached 8,217 microsieverts near 
the F1’s main gate at 8:31 on March 15 [45] and over 
1,015 microsieverts soon afterwards [28] with the 
detection of dangerous levels of radioactive material 
in milk and other local food products on March 19 
and in drinking water of Fukushima’s five local 
government areas on March 22 [45]. Citizens living 
in the region were at the edge of the most serious 
case of radioactive contamination since the former 
Soviet Union’s Chernobyl disaster in 1986.  
Using the International Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale (INES) used by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency (JAEA) rated each reactor accident 
separately. FI has six reactors and four of which were 
operational at the time of the earthquake. Of the four, 
the three reactors with the explosions were rated at 
the Level 5, while one was rated at the Level 3. 
JAEA rated the overall F1 nuclear accident as a Level 
7 on the INES based on the monitoring of high 
radioactive releases over days 4 to 6, with eventually 
a total of some 940 PBq (I-131 eq) [28].                                           
 
3.2. SPEEDI predictive analytics system 
 
The System for Prediction of Environment 
Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) is Japan’s 
predictive analytics network system specifically 
developed to predict and visualize the dispersion and 
density of radioactive material emissions on geo-
spatial maps and to support the national evacuation 
policy decision-making effectiveness [19]. The 
predictive analytics network system was built by 
Fujitsu, Japan in 1986 at a cost of $US 140 million 
(11 billion yen) for the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). 
The 2016 fiscal year budget for operating SPEEDI is 
Yen 710 million ($US 6.28 million) [54]. The 
motivation for the initial development of SPEEDI 
was US Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979. 
In 1980 JAEA undertook the conceptual design with 
an initial system being completed in 1984. With 
continuous investments in hardware updates and 
advanced modelling capability enhancements, the 
SPEEDI network system since 2005 can 
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automatically provide governments at all levels with 
highly advanced predictive analytics capabilities in 
providing real-time forecasts of extreme weather 
events and predictions of radiation flume directions 
shown on geo-spatial maps in response to nuclear 
accidents and radiological emergencies. 
Based on [37] Figure 2 shows a process view of 
the SPEEDI network system architecture. SPEEDI 
receives two other inputs: (1) meteorological data 
from Japan Weather Association MICOS and (2) 
radioactive material release estimate data from ERSS. 
ERSS in turn receives streaming big data 
automatically sent from a national distributed 
network of sensors for environmental radiation 
monitoring located at Japan’s 53 operational nuclear 
power plants. SPEEDI operation and usage are 
governed by Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission 
(NUSTEC) which was established within the Cabinet 
of Japan as an independent lead agency in nuclear 
safety administration [62]. Importantly, once the 
nuclear emergency declaration is issued by the Prime 
Minister of Japan, SPEEDI use is legally mandated 
through the Nuclear Safety Directive [39]. 
 
 
Figure 2. A process view of SPEEDI  
 
SPEEDI predictive modeling and analytics 
outputs – dispersion and density of radioactive 
material emissions on geo-spatial maps – are 
automatically sent to the SPEEDI Network System 
terminals distributed across: (1) central, state and 
local governments, (2) off-site nuclear emergency 
control centers, (3) Cabinet’s nuclear emergency 
response council, (4) MEXT, and (5) Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry’s (MITI) Japan 
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization based on the 
2012 NUSTEC’s Environmental Radiation 
Monitoring Directive (p. 171). 
 
4. Research methodology 
 
In order to address the two research questions, 
we have adopted a case study research methodology 
which comprises field observations, ethnographic 
document analysis and semi-structured case 
interviews. 
An ethnographic approach to document analysis 
argues that “an ethnographic perspective can help 
delineate patterns of human action when document 
analysis is conceptualized as fieldwork” [2, p. 65]. 
Similarly, documents are viewed as a critical data 
source in qualitative research and in the context of 
conducting rigorous document analysis procedure, 
including technical document [34], researchers can 
have virtual field research experiences [8].  
This research specifically examined three different 
documents: (1) Government Report (a total of 592 
pages in Japanese) compiled by National Diet of 
Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission (so-called Jikochou) 
chaired by Professor Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a policy 
analysis expert with nine commission members with 
diverse backgrounds, (2) Private-Sector Report (a 
total of 403 pages with 8 pages of appendix) 
compiled by Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Inspection Commission (so-called 
Rebuilding Japan Initiative) and (3) book (a total of 
238 pages in Japanese) entitled Nuclear Crisis: 
Testimony from Prime Minister of Japan and His 
Cabinet written by Tetsuro Fukuyama, Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary and a politician of the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) who was a key policy maker 
during the reactor meltdowns. During the five days of 
the intensive nuclear disaster response, Fukuyama 
recorded facts and observations on four volumes of 
A4 college notebooks.  
      Semi-structured case interviews were done with 
site visits in Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate – the three 
Prefectures worst hit by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and tsunamis – were made in January 
2012 prior to conducting case interviews with three 
policy experts at Fukushima Prefectural (or state) 
government responsible for disaster response and 
evacuation policies and evacuation policy 
implementation. Each semi-structured case interview 
was conducted in Japanese and lasted approximately 
90 minutes. An additional interview was conducted 
for an hour with a middle-level manager who was 
familiar with SPEEDI use. In 2012 we conducted 
intensive semi-structured interviews with a local 
commercial radio station, Fukushima Radio: board 
members and radio announcers who had first-hand 
experiences in running emergency broadcasting 
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services during the compound disasters, blackouts, 
and the absolute lack of official disaster information.   
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Varying proactive use of SPEEDI   
 
Despite the government investments in ERSS 
and SPEEDI to support citizen protection, mass 
evacuation policy development and policy 
implementation in case of severe nuclear accident, 
ERSS could not provide SPEEDI with timely and 
accurate radioactive material release streaming big 
data due to the problems with environmental 
monitoring sensors located at the F1 site during the 
sustained blackouts. As a result of this data quality 
issue, the predictions of SPEEDI on radioactive 
material dose density and dispersion directions were 
viewed by the central government as “unreliable” and 
its information use to formulate evacuation policies 
as “too risky” for citizen safety [39, p. 383]. As early 
as on March 15, 2011 – four days after the 3.11 
catastrophe, Yomiuri Newspaper reported “problems 
with SPEEDI” [25, p. 35] without sufficient technical 
explanations of the root cause of ERSS whose 
outputs fuel SPEEDI. Some nuclear scientists with 
the knowledge of SPEEDI predictive analytics 
capabilities started to tweet on Twitter to urge the 
government to use SPEEDI [25]. Even though the use 
of SPEEDI was legally mandatory in Japan, after the 
Prime Minister Kan’s national nuclear emergency 
declaration [29], the Kan administration’s nuclear 
crisis response headquarters did not know the 
existence of SPEEDI until the government's top 
spokesman, Yukio Edano, was asked by journalists 
why SPEEDI was not deployed to help government 
more effectively respond to the enfolding nuclear 
accident during one of his frequent TV interviews 
[19, 25]. 
Against this background, however, at 16:00 on 
March 11 (an hour and 14 minutes after the M9.0 
earthquake devastated Fukushima), the Nuclear 
Safety Technology Center responsible for the 
operation of SPEEDI provided MEXT (the central 
government ministry that outsourced the 
development of SPEEDI) with the first SPEEDI 
predictive analytics outputs in the immediate 
aftermath of the F1 blackout. At this time SPEEDI 
was operational in the normal operation mode. At 
16:40 the operation of SPEEDI shifted to the crisis 
operation mode [25]. Various mass media reported 
that over 1,000 (even over 5,000) pages of SPEEDI 
data/outputs were generated by NUSTEC during the 
first five critical days of the F1 reactor meltdowns. 
Using the geo-spatial maps of radioactive material 
density and dispersion directions (SPEEDI 
predictions), MEXT could send radiation monitoring 
cars to collect actual real-time environmental 
radiation data from the affected local areas. However, 
according to Akira Tsubosaka, a senior MEXT 
official responsible for the SPEEDI operation, the 
Japanese central government did not publish the 
SPEEDI data proactively and openly until March 23, 
2011 when it was pressured to do so [19, 27, 39, 52]. 
Our case interview of the Fukushima Prefectural 
(or state-level) government’s manager who was 
knowledgeable of SPEEDI predictive analytics 
capabilities acknowledged that they had received the 
SPEEDI predictions automatically sent from MEXT, 
which were timely used for their citizen evacuation 
decisions. Other two interviewees responsible for 
evacuation policy implementation observed that 
while the local governments might have also received 
the SPEEDI predictions, many of them lost their key 
staff and suffered substantial damage to their IT 
infrastructure and information processing capacity 
and might not be able to use SPEEDI predictions 
effectively and timely. 
 
5.2. Mass evacuation policy conundrum  
 
The Kan administration’s nuclear emergency 
response headquarters reviewed the enfolding nuclear 
crisis, under the conditions of (1) a very sporadic 
limited information and knowledge sharing on the 
part of TEPCO regarding the F1 nuclear crisis 
response operations, and (2) the absence of local 
disaster communications from the Fukushima 
Prefecture governor and the local government leaders 
[19]. The Kan administration’s nuclear crisis 
response headquarters were particularly frustrated 
with the lack of transparency and the inability of Mr. 
Takekuro, TEPCO Fellow, who was purposefully co-
located at the headquarters to facilitate open 
information sharing and knowledge transfer between 
the central government and TEPCO [19], which 
raised the question of TEPCO’s institutional 
trustworthiness [33]. Against these turbulent and 
uncertain decision environments, the central 
government, still without using SPEEDI, discussed 
that a best evacuation policy option might be to use 
the existing standard evacuation policy with very 
limited scale nuclear emergency mass evacuation 
operations, which could minimize the local citizens’ 
unnecessary radiation exposure. However, the 
headquarters’ policy decision makers eventually 
decided against the existing standard evacuation 
policy of 3 kilometer radius of the F1 site. Instead 
they decided to escalate the scale to a temporary 
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exclusion zone of 10 kilometer (6.2 miles) at 3:59 on 
March 12 [19].  
Without the use of SPEEDI, the central 
government was in the dark as to the predicted 
directions of radio-active material flows. Logistically, 
local governments needed to provide the public with 
ground transportation, the evacuation centers, food, 
water, heaters and blankets in the cold month of 
March. Many roads were still totally or partially 
impassable, causing the absolute shortage of gasoline 
for cars [19].  
Meanwhile, at the time of the central 
government’s initial evacuation policy announcement 
to the state and the local governments, TEPCO was 
attempting to open four emergency bents manually to 
avoid hydrogen explosions. Despite the highly risky 
“heroic’ efforts made by TEPCO engineers who 
determined to stay at the site to regain operational 
control over the damaged nuclear reactors, the first 
sighting of white smoke/steam was reported at the 
No. 1 reactor. This incident accelerated the speed of 
mass evacuations at 10:17 on March 12. Later at 
15:36 first hydrogen explosions occurred at the No. 1 
reactor before the initial mass evacuation was 
completed [45]. 
The second hydrogen explosions at the No. 3 
reactor occurred at 11:01 on March 14. Another 
hydrogen explosions at the No. 2 reactor followed at 
6:14 on March 15. In the immediate aftermath of the 
explosions, TEPCO recorded an extremely dangerous 
level of 817 microsieverts radioactive material near 
the main gate. With the enfolding and escalating 
nuclear disasters, the central government revised the 
earlier 10 kilometer mass evacuation policy and 
issued an escalated 20 kilometer (12 miles) radius 
around the F1 site and a 30 kilometers (19 miles) 
radius voluntary evacuation zone from the F1 site. 
This revised mass evacuation policy was made again 
without any SPEEDI predictions and meaningful 
insights into the density and dispersion of radioactive 
material subject to the prevailing weather and 
geographical conditions for which SPEEDI was 
designed, developed and was actually operated at the 
time by MEXT [39]. Perhaps due to their own lack of 
knowledge about SPEEDI capability as well as the 
lack of openness and transparency on the part of 
TEPCO senior executives, the nuclear emergency 
response headquarters continued to revise the critical 
mass evacuation policies in the dark and blindfolded 
in the initial time-critical turbulent times. 
Later when the Kan administration learned about 
the SPEEDI predictive analytics distributed network 
system, the Prime Minister with a Master’s degree in 
engineering from Japan’s top engineering university 
gathered a small group of trusted nuclear scientists 
who had expert knowledge of SPEEDI predictive 
modelling capabilities. The group through their 
effective use of SPEEDI could rapidly answer the 
technical questions the policy makers raised. 
Importantly, for example, one scientist managed to 
bypass the data quality problem related to ERSS and 
produced usable and valuable predictive modelling 
and analytics results through his intensive use of 
SPEEDI for the policy makers [20].  
 
5.3. Damage to perceived political efficacy  
The various Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
inquiry reports that were tabled severely criticized the 
Kan administration’s ineffective and slow responses 
to the escalating nuclear crisis, demanding his 
resignation. In response DPJ Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan resigned in August 2011 [50]. The opposition 
party, LDP, won the parliamentary elections in 
December 2012 and LDP Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda was inaugurated. More recently, Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, the President of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was inaugurated as the third 
Abe administration in December 2014. 
Both Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama experienced the 
terror of the reactor meltdowns with its clear and 
imminent danger which could end the nation. They 
both reached the same conclusion: Japan must stop 
its heavy reliance on 53 nuclear reactors for power 
generation [29]. 
On the one hand, based on post-earthquake 
assessments of the effectiveness of the existing 
nuclear regulatory authority, a new nuclear regulatory 
agency and new standards for nuclear power plants 
were created [22, 53].  On the other hand, on March 
16, 2016, the commissioners of Japan’s Nuclear 
Regulation Authority (NRA) rejected a request made, 
in December 2015, by 12 Japanese Prefectural 
Governors that NRA need to continue to operating 
SPEEDI to help determine best evacuation policy 
options in the event of a severe accident [54]. Finally, 
as for TEPCO, in February 2016, three former senior 
executives responsible for the governance of the F1 
operation, were criminally charged with professional 
negligence resulting in deaths and injury for their role 
in the 2011 “man-made” nuclear accident [14]. 
 
5.4. Barriers to proactive use of SPEEDI 
 
On the surface, the general lack of technological 
knowledge and understanding of SPEEDI system and 
mistrust in data quality [24] were the key barriers to 
proactive use of SPEEDI by the central government 
in general and the key policy decision makers of the 
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nuclear emergency response headquarters in 
particular. Strategically, it is difficult to understand 
the complete failure to use SPEEDI by the central 
government, given the Directive, the existing legal 
framework, mandates proactive use of SPEEDI once 
the declaration of the national nuclear emergency is 
made by the Prime Minister of Japan. 
At deeper levels, however, there are underlying 
political and institutional factors that contributed to 
the general lack of technical knowledge and 
understanding of SPEEDI predictive analytical 
capabilities among Japan’s policy decision makers 
and policy implementers. Politically, Japan’s central 
governments rapidly and frequently changed, with 18 
different prime ministers and 3 different political 
parties (LDP 12 times, JNP once, JRP once, JSP once 
and DPJ three times) since 1987 to the present which 
roughly covers the period which SPEEDI was 
conceptually designed, developed and operated. In 
general, Japan’s central government pushed 
technological innovations for economic development 
and global competitiveness. But as the policy 
decision makers so rapidly changed, the general 
knowledge of SPEEDI might not be transferred from 
one administration to another. Institutionally, there 
has been serious problems of government silos and 
technology fear [26] and inter-agency distrust [4; 9], 
making inter-agency communication, collaboration 
and knowledge sharing difficult.  
The Nuclear Safety Technology Center 
responsible for the operation of SPEEDI was located 
within MEXT to safeguard citizens and society from 
nuclear accidents, whereas the now defunct nuclear 
regulatory authority at the time of the Fukushima 
nuclear accident was located within the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry which has been the key 
driver for nuclear energy policy and nuclear industry 
development.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
As we discussed our key findings in the previous 
section, MEXT used the SPEEDI predictive analytics 
distributed network system to produce and distribute 
the predictions, despite the ERSS data quality 
problem without much delay in the aftermath of the 
3.11 compound catastrophe that devastated 
Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures. Moreover, 
MEXT used the predictions to dispatch monitoring 
cars to the high-risk local areas, using the SPEEDI-
produced geo-spatial maps, to collect radioactive 
material release data in real time. These data replaced 
the streaming big data that could not be provided by 
ERSS, and hence improving the values of SPEEDI 
predictive analytics over time. In addition to MEXT’s 
proactive use of SPEEDI at the central government 
level, the geospatial maps, outputs of SPEEDI 
predictive analytics, were automatically sent to the 
Fukushima Prefectural government which used the 
predictions timely for enhancing their mass 
evacuation policy decision making effectiveness. The 
state government policy makers could urge some of 
the local governments to launce immediate 
evacuation operations, without waiting for the central 
government’s much delayed initial evacuation policy 
announcement. In stark contrast, the central 
government policy decision makers failed to 
proactively use SPEEDI.  
Our results indicate how predictive analytics 
systems are used – either proactively and intensively 
or reactively or latently – seemed to facilitate (or 
inhibit) the extent of strategic agility and operational 
flexibility with which strategically and politically 
critical policy decisions are made. Using the adapted 
model of strategic decision-making effectiveness 
[15], we interpret our key findings and argue that the 
relative absence of procedural rationality (PR) 
combined with the clear presence of political 
behavior (PB) may explain the failed proactive use of 
SPEEDI by the key policy decision makers of the 
nuclear emergency response headquarters at the 
central government. The deeper underlying inhibitive 
barriers we discussed in the previous section may 
have contributed to the relative absence of PR and the 
clear presence of PB. In contrast, the proactive use of 
SPEEDI by MEXT and the Fukushima Prefectural 
government can show some evidence of the enabling 
role of SPEEDI in increasing PR.  
According to Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama, the then 
DPJ Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kan’s trusted 
policy chief, the Cabinet policy makers struggled to 
obtain accurate and timely information from TEPCO 
on the extent of the damage to the F1 site [19]. Both 
Fukuyama in his book and Prime Minister in his book 
[29] expressed their high-level frustration with the 
lack of competence of the TEPCO Fellow and other 
nuclear technology experts in informing the policy 
makers. This may be interpreted as the presence of 
PB or the problem of extant knowledge divide 
between TEPCO and the Japanese policy makers, 
hence hindering cognitive absorptive capacity [1], 
knowledge sharing [49] and trust in data quality [47]. 
In answering these questions, this study 
contributes to new research on predictive analytics 
use in government towards policy decision-making 
effectiveness by increasing PR and controlling PB, 
with the need for more input and analytical insights 
from (1) the proactive use of predictive analytics, (2) 
engagement of external experts through the shared 
use of predictive analytics tools, and (3) through the 
2678
distributed use of said tools, engagement of local 
government decision makers who are tasked to 
implement the central government’s evacuation 
policy. We hold that such an open policy making will 
create greater public values for citizens and society, 
while mitigating political and institutional barriers in 
turbulent times. However, we have research 
limitations that result from not having access to the 
policy decision makers through case interviews. Our 
future research directions include the application of 
the modified model of strategic decision-making 
effectiveness, with the added concept of IT use, to 
interview local-level policy decision makers. 
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